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Hopkins: Torts - Should a Plaintiff's Intervening Act Be an Absolute Defen

TORTS-Should a Plaintiff's Intervening Act Be An Absolute Defense
Under Comparative Negligence? Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089
(Wyo. 1985).
On September 2, 1981, Joseph Buckley ordered some regular gasoline
from Bryce and Earl Bell, the owners of Johnie's, a petroleum dealership.
Instead of delivering regular gasoline as requested, the Bells mistakenly
delivered diesel fuel. Using a portable tank filled by the Bells, Buckley
filled his gasoline engine hay baler with diesel fuel, believing it to be regular
gasoline. Buckley started the baler and had driven it about one hundred
feet when it started coughing and backfiring. Then the engine died. After
discovering that the engine was filled with diesel fuel, he drove to Johnie's
and informed the Bells of their misdelivery. The Bells' employees knew
of their improper delivery and offered to replace the diesel fuel with regular
gasoline.1
Buckley returned to his ranch, drained the diesel/gasoline mixture onto
the ground and purged the engine by jumping the solenoid to pump the
diesel fuel from the fuel line. He placed his hand over the carburetor to
choke the engine and just as the gasoline started to flow from the fuel
line, he removed his hand from the carburetor. At that moment, the engine
then
backfired and the gasoline ignited. The diesel fuel on the ground
2
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Buckley sued the Bells for damages to his hay baler and for costs incurred in contracting to harvest his hay.3 In its decision in favor of the
Bells, the Lincoln County District Court found that the Bells' act of selling the wrong fuel to Buckley did not proximately cause the fire that
destroyed the baler. Buckley's acts were considered an efficient intervening cause which absolved the Bells from liability. 4 On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that
there was an insufficient causal connection between the Bells' act of selling the wrong fuel to Buckley and the destruction of the hay baler.'
The Buckley decision presents a conflict between Wyoming's comparative negligence statute and the Wyoming Supreme Court's application of proximate cause where a plaintiff's intervening act provides an
absolute defense to a defendant's original negligent act. This casenote will
examine that conflict and discuss whether the traditional approach should
be reconsidered in light of Wyoming's adoption of comparative negligence.
Because Wyoming has adopted Wisconsin's comparative negligence stat1. Brief for Appellant at 3, Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1985) [hereinafter
Appellant's Brief].
2. Id at 4.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Wyo. 1985).
5. Id at 1095.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1986

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 21 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 16

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXI

ute, the Buckley decision will be reexamined in a comparative negligence
context, using Wisconsin's approach for guidance6
BACKGROUND

General Standards of Proximate Cause
A determination of liability for a negligent act begins with the question of whether the act in fact caused the injury or damage. If the harm
would not have occurred but for the act, the act is generally considered
to be a "cause in fact" of the injury.' But the "cause in fact" test sweeps
too broadly and its application would "set society on edge and fill the
courts with endless litigation.'"I Consequently, the concept of proximate
cause arose to place limits on a defendant's liability. 9 Although this determination adds confusion to the proximate cause concept, it is based on
policy considerations requiring that the defendant be held liable only for
conduct that is so closely connected to the injury that the law is justified
in imposing liability.10
6. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977) provides:

(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence was
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought.
Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributed to the person recovering.
(b) The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
(i) If a jury trial, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts;
(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of fact,
determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party. The court shall then reduce the amount of such
damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person
recovering;
(iii) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of negligence.
See Wis. STAT. ANN. 331.045 (1931).
7. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CAL. L. REV.
229-230 n.1 (1932). This test is commonly known as the sine qua non or "but for" test.

8. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1981) (quoting North v.

Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894)).
9. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]. Defined literally, proximate means "near or immediate." When "proximate" is
coupled with "cause," the term suggests an emphasis on physical or mechanical closeness.
"Legal cause" or "responsible cause" might be more appropriate terms, as they do not imply proximity in time and space but rather imply liability for negligent acts. Id.
10. Id. § 41, at 264. The application of promixate cause has long been the subject of
controversy in negligence law, the primary criticism being that it is too difficult to define
and its meaning is not understood by jurors. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 103, at 1128. According
to Prosser, "[tihere is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion." PROSSER, supra
note 9, § 41, at 263. The confusion is not limited to disagreement among the states, but may
exist within a single state as well. Prosser notes that only a few states have attempted to
trace the path of their courts to determine if their decisions based on proximate cause are
consistent. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California,38 CAL. L. REV. 369, 370 (1950). Although
some commentators advocate an abolition of the proximate cause concept as a means for
determining whether a defendant's negligent act should result in liability, the difficulty courts
have in coming to an agreement regarding a standard definition for proximate cause appears
to be an insufficient reason to discard its use. See, e.g., Green, Proximate Cause in Texas
Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1950).
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Some courts, including the Wyoming Supreme Court, have adopted
what has been called the "traditional" definition of proximate cause." In
Lemos v. Madden," the first Wyoming decision concerning proximate
cause, the Supreme Court defined proximate cause as "that cause which
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.""2 In 1960, the court offered another definition for proximate cause in Frazierv. Pokorny.'4 In Frazier,the court held that a proximate cause is one which is the natural and probable consequence of one's
actions. 5 An injury is considered to be natural and probable if looking
back upon the act it appears to be reasonable, rather than extraordinary."6
Other courts find that an act is the proximate cause of the injury if
it is a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm.7 Although often
regarded as a test for cause in fact,18 the substantial factor test has gained
wide acceptance as a test for proximate cause as well." The Wyoming
Supreme Court has, on occasion, applied this rule.2" For instance, in
McClennan v. Tottenhoff,2' a 1983 decision, the court quoted the New
Jersey Supreme Court" which held that a tortfeasor is liable for injuries
which his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about.
Under this test, normal or23foreseeable intervening causes do not relieve
the tortfeasor of liability.

The use of different tests for proximate cause makes uniform decisions difficult. In Lemos v. Madden, the majority observed that the ex11. Gilliland v. Rhoads, 539 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Wyo. 1975).
12. 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791 (1921).
13. Id at 10, 200 P. 793. This definition is perhaps the most common definition of proximate cause. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 103, at 1128.
14. 349 P.2d 324, 329 (Wyo. 1960).
15. Id
16. Id
17. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 103 at 1157. The "substantial factor" test is incorporated
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965), and these rules for causation have been
adopted in Wyoming. Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089,1094 (Wyo. 1985). RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965) provides:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no
rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which
his negligence has resulted in the harm.
Under the Restatement rules for causation not only must the subsequent act intervene, but
it must also supersede the original negligence. A superseding cause, according to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965), "is an act by a third person or other force which by
its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about."
18. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 42, at 278.
19. Id In fact, following the lead case of Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.Ry.
Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920), the Restatement of Torts adopted the substantial
factor test for proximate cause.
20. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983); Phelps v. Woodward Construction Co., 118 Wyo. 611, 204 P.2d 179 (1949).
21. 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
22. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
23. Id.at 203, 156 A.2d at 9, cited in McClellan, 666 P.2d at 414.
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istence of more than one test may result in different decisions in cases
with similar facts.2 4 But despite the confusion caused by the application
of proximate cause, courts continue to use it to establish liability for effects to which a tortfeasor's wrongful act actually contributed. 5
The Concept of Intervening Cause
When courts decide whether liability should be imposed on the defendant, two conflicting policy considerations arise. The first consideration
is whether the defendant should be liable for harm that is the result of
acts of independent origin. The second consideration is whether the defendant should be relieved of liability for acts that he has in fact caused.2 6
In an effort to resolve this conflict, courts developed the concept of intervening cause.7

The meaning of intervening cause, like proximate cause, is generally
easier to comprehend than it is to define. In essence an intervening cause
is simply any cause that comes into active operation after the defendant's
negligent act has been committed.28 Generally, the intervening cause concept applies to subsequent acts by any intervening agency,"' whether the
agency is a third party, a natural phenomenon or the plaintiff himself.
The intervening cause issue has arisen in several Wyoming cases. In
Lemos v. Madden,30 a sheepherder tending his employer's sheep was left
without heating fuel when a severe storm arose. The sheep wandered off,
and with the storm still raging the next morning, he ventured after them.
The herder was severely injured when he was forced to stay out all night
in the bitter cold. He claimed that his injuries were proximately caused
by his employer's failure to deliver the fuel, which ultimately required him
to venture out in pursuit of the sheep.2 The Wyoming Supreme Court
held that the employer's failure to deliver heating fuel was not the proximate cause of the employee's injuries.2 2 According to the court, venturing into the storm was an intervening act, rendering the original wrong
a remote cause. 33 Since the injuries to the employee were improbable, the
causal chain was broken and the employer was absolved from liability. '
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 11, 200 P. 791, 794 (1921).
PROSSER, supra note 9, § 42, at 272.
Id. § 44, at 301.
Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1965).
PROSSER, supra note 9, § 44, at 301.

29. To constitute an intervening act, an act must be committed after the defendant's

original negligence and must create a new and independent force than the force originally
created by the defendant. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 301-302.
30. 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791 (1921).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 8, 200 P. at 793. According to the court in Lemos, a remote cause is an improbable cause. A proximate cause in contrast is a probable cause. Id. Generally, a remote
cause is an independent cause that is not part of a natural succession of events leading to
an injury. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1164 (5th ed. 1979).
34. Lemos, 28 Wyo. at 8, 200 P. at 793.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol21/iss2/16

4

Hopkins: Torts - Should a Plaintiff's Intervening Act Be an Absolute Defen

1986

CASE NoTEs

The intervening cause concept arose again in Kopriva v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co.35 In Kopriva, a Union Pacific train struck and damaged an
overpass bridge, thus necessitating the closure of one side of the divided
highway. When the plaintiffs attempted to cross the bridge by way of
the single remaining lane, they collided with another motorist and were
seriously injured. The plaintiffs alleged that the railroad company's
negligent act of damaging the bridge caused their injuries. 6 The court
held that the act of the other motorist intervened and precluded recovery."
The Wyoming Supreme Court overturned a well established state
precedent 38 in McClellan v. Tottenhoff, when it imposed liability where
a remote act caused injury. 9 In McClellan, a tavern owner sold alcohol
to an underage purchaser. After drinking the alcohol, the minor struck
another car with his automobile and killed the driver. 40 The court held that
the acts of the minor drinking the alcohol and driving his car prior to the
accident did not intervene. 4' Instead, the court determined that when the
tavern owner sold the liquor to the minor, it was reasonably foreseeable
that the minor would drink the liquor, become intoxicated, drive while
intoxicated and injure or kill someone. Therefore, selling the alcohol to
the minor was the proximate cause of the death. None of the acts subsequent to the liquor sale were unforeseeable and consequently the acts did
not bar recovery. In what amounts to an extension of the Lemos rule, the
court held that "the ultimate test concerning proximate cause will be
whether the vendor could foresee injury to a third person." 42 If injury to
a third person is foreseeable, then intervening acts will not bar recovery.
More recently, in Robertson v. TWP, Inc.,43 the owners of property
adjacent to a development area sued the development company when their
homes were damaged by blowing dirt. In turn, the development company
filed a third party suit against the seller of the development property.
The seller's failure to provide adequate sewer facilities forced the
municipality to deny a final plat to the development company, thereby
halting construction and leaving loose dirt exposed to winter winds. The
developer alleged that the seller's failure to provide the sewer service proximately caused the damages to the property owners' homes." The court
35. 592 P.2d 711 (Wyo. 1979).
36. Id at 712.
37. Id at 713.
38. In Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971), the court held that tavern owners
could not be held liable for injuries caused by their patrons. This ruling was reversed in
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
39. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983). Prior to McClellan, the court
refused to impose liability on a tavern owner since the act of drinking the alcohol, and not
the act of selling the alcohol, was considered to be the proximate cause of the injury. Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971).
40. McClellan, 666 P.2d at 408.
41. Id.
42. Id at 414. An injury is foreseeable "if it is a probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful act or is a normal response to the stimulus of the situation created thereby."
Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1985).
43. 656 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1983).
44. Id. at 550-51.
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held that the act of the developer in exposing the dirt to the wind was
an intervening act and barred recovery. The court observed that "it would
be difficult to conceive of a more clear example of an efficient intervening
cause than that portrayed by the facts here.'"
In Lemos, a case tried prior to Wyoming's adoption of comparative
negligence, the plaintiff's intervening act barred recovery. In McClellan,
Robertson and Kopriva, cases decided after the adoption of comparative
negligence, a third party intervened and comparative negligence principles
were not applied. When an intervening act is attributable to the plaintiffs conduct, however, comparative negligence principles become relevant.
Comparative Negligence in Wyoming
Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence, the doctrine of contributory negligence was under severe criticism. Many accident victims
were either inadequately compensated or were not compensated at all, even
when their contributory negligence was slight.46 In an effort to alleviate
the harshness of contributory negligence, Wyoming enacted what is known
as the "equal to or greater than" rule for comparative negligence.4 7 Under
this rule when both the plaintiff and the defendant are negligent, their
respective negligence is compared. If the plaintiff's negligence is greater
than or equal to the negligence of the defendant, then he may not recover
from the defendant. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff's negligence is less
than that of the defendant, the damages are apportioned on the basis of
the comparative fault attributable to each party.4"
The Wyoming Supreme Court has retained the Lemos rule for proximate cause in situations in which the plaintiff does not contribute to his
injuries.4 9 In situations in which the plaintiff is negligent, and his conduct does not amount to an intervening cause, the court apportions fault.
But when the court determines that the plaintiff's act intervenes, the application of traditional intervening cause concepts becomes uncertain. One
commentator asserts that cases decided before comparative negligence,
in which a "supervening" act by the plaintiff breaks the causal chain of
the defendant's original negligent act, might be subject to reconsideration.5" This reasoning is persuasive since comparative negligence allows
courts to reach fair decisions by apportioning some of the blame to the
defendant who committed the original wrong and some of the blame to
the plaintiff or a third party whose act contributed to his injury." Other
Id at 551.
Heft & Heft, ComparativeNegligence: Wisconsin'sAnswer, 55 ABA J. 127 (1969).
See Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977).
Comment, Comparative Negligence Practice in Wyoming, 18 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 713, 715 (1983).
49. Buckley cited the Lemos rule for proximate cause. Buckley, 703 P.2d at 1091.
50. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, § 4.3, at 87-88 (1974 & Supp. 1981). A
supervening cause is defined as "[a] new effective cause which, operating independently of
anything else, becomes proximate cause of accident." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (5th
ed. 1979).
51. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, § 4.3, at 87-88.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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commentators believe that proximate cause theory will be unaffected.5 2
How a particular state applies proximate cause under comparative
negligence has largely become a question of public policy.53
Wyoming's previous decisions concerning proximate cause have the
following in common: either the cases were decided before the adoption
of comparative negligence 54 or, if decided after the adoption of comparative
negligence, there was no apportionment issue. 5 The Buckley case presents
the question of whether an intervening act by the plaintiff raises an issue
of apportionment or whether traditional proximate cause concepts should
be applied to completely bar recovery.
The Buckley v. Bell Decision
In Buckley v. Bell, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's act constituted a complete bar to recovery. Although Mr. Buckley
argued for a consideration of comparative negligence on appeal, the majority did not address the issue.56 Instead, the court focused on the question of whether the Restatement test and Wyoming Supreme Court
precedent5 would yield the same result when applied to the facts of the
case. Applying the Lemos and McClellanrules for proximate and intervening cause, the court held that since Buckley's acts intervened and were
unforeseeable, the original negligence of the Bells was too far removed
from the fire to impose liability.58 To reconcile the Lemos and McClellan
definitions, the court said that conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm if the conduct causes injury "in natural and continuous
sequence," and the sequence of events is "unbroken by a sufficient intervening cause." 59 Without discussing their reasoning, the court also
found that the Restatement rules for proximate cause were applicable and
the result under those rules would be the same.6"
The dissent, on the other hand, refused to accept the premise that the
Bells were in no way at fault for Buckley's damages. 61 According to
Justices Rose and Cardine, Wyoming's comparative negligence rules pro52. Laugesen, Colorado Comparative Negligence, 48 DENVER L.J. 469, 486 (1972).
53. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, § 4.2, at 85. See supra note 25.
54. Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791 (1921).
55. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983); Robertson v. TWP, Inc. 656
P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1983); Kopriva v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 592 P.2d 711 (Wyo. 1979). In these
cases, intervening acts were attributable to a third party, so there was no apportionment issue.
56. Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 14, 19. Although not raised as one of Buckley's
issues on appeal, he argued that the Lemos rule should not be applicable under modern concepts of comparative negligence. Furthermore, Buckley argued that he should not have been
completely precluded from recovery since comparative negligence could have been applied
to limit his recovery.
57. The court looked to the following Wyoming cases concerning proximate cause:
Robertson v. TWP, Inc., 656 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1983); Kopriva v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 592 P.2d
711 (Wyo. 1979); Connett v. Fremont Cty. Sch. Dist., 581 P.2d 1097 (Wyo. 1978); Gilliland
v. Rhoads, 539 P.2d 1221 (Wyo. 1975); and Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791 (1921).
58. Buckley, 703 P.2d at 1092.
59. Id.
60. Id at 1092, 1094.
61. Id. at 1095 (Rose, J., dissenting); Id. at 1095 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
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vided a simple solution to the problem by allowing the fact finder to determine the proportion of fault attributable to each party and to apportion
the damages as necessary. Justice Cardine, advocating the abolition of
intervening cause as an absolute defense to a defendant's original
negligence, said:
With the adoption of comparative negligence, old musty doctrines, replicas of the dinosaur age when contributory
negligence-no matter how slight-was a complete defense, have
been held no longer valid or appropriate.... I cannot agree that
as a matter of law or fact appellee was not in any way at fault
for this occurrence. I much prefer the simplicity of comparative
negligence under which the fact finder simply determines the
percentage of negligence of the respective parties rather than the
confusion of old incomprehensible doctrines left over from a dif6
ferent era. 1

In Buckley, the court's uncertainty concerning the application of comparative negligence is apparent. The opposing positions of the majority
and the dissenters illustrate that Wyoming's traditional application of
proximate cause, under which a plaintiff's intervening act always bars
recovery, might be outdated in light of comparative negligence.
ANALYSIS

By refusing to reverse the trial court's decision and remand the case
for a determination of proportional fault, the majority failed to adhere
to the purposes of comparative negligence-to alleviate the harshness that
results when a plaintiff negligently contributes to his own injuries. Prior
to the dissenting opinions in Buckley, the Wyoming Supreme Court had
not addressed the issue of whether an intervening act of the plaintiff
should be compared with the negligence of the defendant for purposes of
apportionment. Instead, the court continued to rely on the rule adopted
in 1921 in Lemos v. Madden, or alternatively, applied a "substantial factor" test. 3
In view of comparative negligence, the outcome in Buckley should
have been different. In Sherman v. Platte County,6 4 the court held that
the
"[clomparative negligence only abrogated absolute defenses involving
plaintiff's own negligence in bringing about his or her injuries." 6 A finding that the plaintiff's intervening act bars an originally negligent defendant from liability is an absolute defense. By precluding recovery where
a plaintiff's act intervenes, the court is compromising the rules of comparative negligence. Such results are incompatible with the rules and
policies of comparative negligence in Wyoming.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1095-96 (Cardine, J., dissenting).
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982).
Id. at 790.
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Wyoming cases decided after the adoption of comparative negligence
demonstrate a clear trend toward the abolition of all absolute defenses
for negligent acts where the plaintiff's act contributed to the injury. In
direct response to the adoption of comparative negligence, the court in
Barnette v. Doyle66 disposed of the defense of contributory negligence.
Likewise, in Brittain v. Booth, the court held that the defense of assumption of risk, since it has never been distinguished from contributory
negligence in Wyoming, no longer provides an absolute defense.6 1 In Danculovich v. Brown, the court eliminated last clear chance as an absolute
defense. 6 The court in O'Donnell v. City of Casper,69 held that the obvious
danger rule is not an absolute defense to a plaintiff's negligence except
in cases involving landowners and in ice and snow cases. 0
Although an intervening act can be attributable to any agency, when
the intervening act is attributable to the plaintiff, it is similar to other
absolute defenses already abrogated by the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Under the Buckley rule, a plaintiff's intervening act completely bars
recovery as did contributory negligence, assumption of risk, last clear
chance, and known and obvious danger prior to Wyoming's adoption of
comparative negligence. As noted earlier, the purpose of comparative
negligence is to eliminate the harshness which results when a plaintiff's
own negligence operates to bar recovery." This is as much the case when
the plaintiff intervenes as when he assumes the risk, is contributorily
negligent, fails to take the last clear chance or fails to avoid a known and
obvious danger.
Comparison of the Wisconsin and Wyoming Approaches
In 1973, Wyoming adopted Wisconsin's comparative negligence
statute verbatim. 7 Because the statutes are identical, and in light of
Wisconsin's greater experience in dealing with comparative negligence,
it is helpful to look to Wisconsin's application of the proximate cause concept in cases in which there is an issue of apportionment.1
In 1931, the year of Wisconsin's adoption of comparative negligence,7 4
the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided the case of Osborne v. Mont66. 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981).
67. Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1979).
68. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 194-95 (Wyo. 1979).
69. 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985).
70. For further analysis of this case, see Note, The Obvious DangerRule-A Qualified
Adoption of Secondary Assumption ofRisk Analysis: O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 21 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 251, 259 (1986).
71. Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981).
72. Id See also Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1977).
73. Pre-1971 Wisconsin cases are helpful as interpretive aids to questions that arise
in Wyoming, as Wyoming adopted Wisconsin's statute. See Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo.
317, 100 P.2d 102 (1940), which held that in Wyoming, if an identical statute is adopted
from another state that has a known and definite construction, it is presumed that Wyoming's courts will adopt the construction thus given. See also Comment, Comparative
Negligence in Wyoming, 8 LAND & WATER L. REv. 597, 601 (1973).
74. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1931). Although amended in 1971, Wisconsin's post-1971
decisions are still applicable in Wyoming to the extent that the decisions do not revolve around
the "49-50 percent distinction." See Comment, supra note 73, at 601.
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gomery." In Osborne, the court held that for a party to be found liable,
his act must be a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.7
This holding is the basis for Wisconsin's test for proximate cause.17 In
the more recent case of Blashaski v. ClassifiedRisk InsuranceCorp., the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that intervening causes are often considered to be substantial factors."8 In situations in which there is more
than one substantial factor contributing to the same result, the contribution of each factor is considered and its percentage of total cause is
determined.
Apparently, the district court in Buckley found that the Bells' act was
a substantial factor, and the majority did not dispute this. In addition,
the district court did not find Buckley's act of draining the fuel uncommon.7 9 District Court Judge John D. Troughton stated:
I don't know how many times I've watched farmers and ranchers do exactly what Mr. Buckley has done and I don't know exactly how many times I've done what Mr. Buckley has done in
this case. It's not, actually, uncommon. I can remember being out
there in the hay field in my own experience, tearing the carburetor
apart and trying to make it run and doing exactly what Mr.
Buckley has done. So I know it's common.""
Having said this, the district court nonetheless found the Bells to be completely free from liability since Buckley's act was determined to have intervened."
In Wisconsin, the fact finder would have been allowed to make a determination of each party's contribution. Under Wisconsin's rule for causation, an intervening force is not a defense where an original negligent act
is determined to be a substantial factor in causing the resultant injury. 2
According to Wisconsin's reasoning,
if the [defendant's] conduct or omission set in motion the forces
which caused the damage, or was a substantial factor in causing
the damage, the defense of intervening force is unavailing. If the
trier of fact determines that defendant's conduct or omission was
the dominant cause which put in motion the other forces, [defendant] is liable. ....
.3

75. 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
76. Id. at 242, 234 N.W. at 379.
77. HEFT & HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL, § 7.155, at 31 (1978). See
WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 1500, at 3.
78. Blashaski v. Classified Risk Insurance Corp., 48 Wis. 2d 169, 179 N.W.2d 924 (1970).

See Campbell, Duty, Faul4 andLegalCause, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 402 for a discussion on Wisconsin's policy reasons for adopting the "substantial factor" test.
79. Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting transcript of the trial court's
proceedings).
80. Id RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447(c), at 478 (1965) states that an act is
not superseding if it is "a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct. ....
"
81. Buckley, 703 P.2d at 1092.
82. Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 271 N.W.2d 79 (1977).
83. Id. at 475, 271 N.W.2d at 86 (quoting Schneider F. & S. Co. v. Thomas H. Bentley

& Son, 26 Wis. 2d 549, 554, 133 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1965)).
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CASE NOTES

Under Wisconsin law, if the original negligence is considered to be a
substantial factor and the plaintiff's act intervenes, then a jury determines
whether the intervening act supersedes the original negligence. For an
intervening act to supersede the original negligence the act "must be such
that the conscience of the court would be shocked if the first actor were
not relieved from liability. '

84

If it is not superseding, then the above

Wisconsin decisions suggest that an intervening act is not an absolute

bar, but is a basis for apportionment.8 5 The superseding cause test sim-

ply provides the means to relieve the defendant from liability where it
would be "wholly unreasonable" for policy reasons to hold him liable.

The situation in Buckley presents no policy reason why it would be
"wholly unreasonable" for the Bells to answer in damages in proportion
to their fault. Nor should it "shock the court's conscience" to hold the
Bells' liable for their proportion of fault in causing Buckley's injuries. On
the contrary, there are strong policy reasons for imposing proportional
fault, especially in light of Judge Troughton's observation that Buckley's
acts were not uncommon and in view of Wyoming's recent decisions
abrogating absolute defenses involving a plaintiff's own negligence.
Apparently Wyoming has adopted the Restatement's requirement
that to bar recovery, an intervening act must also be considered a
superseding act. If Wyoming continues to apply the Lemos rule or the
combined Lemos/McClellan rule developed in Buckley, intervening acts
by the plaintiff that supersede the original negligence will always break
the causal chain that must be unbroken for proximate cause to exist. Consequently, a plaintiff is completely barred from recovery, as was Mr.
Buckley when he acted not uncommonly in his predicament. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff's act is not superseding, the defendant carries the
fault individually. Under the Wisconsin test, the rules of comparative
negligence provide an equitable solution to the proximate cause problem
by allowing a comparison of the relative negligence of each party. Adoption of this test will allow comparative negligence to work without interference from outdated doctrines like "intervening cause." The result
will be a more equitable and easily applied rule for determining negligence
in cases like Buckley v. Bell, in which both parties contribute to the same
injury.
CONCLUSION

Since Wyoming's adoption of comparative negligence, it is apparent
that the Wyoming Supreme Court strongly disfavors absolute defenses
to a defendant's negligent acts in situations in which the plaintiff is also
negligent. Under present Wyoming law, intervening acts by a plaintiff
84. Stewart, 85 Wis. 2d at 476, 271 N.W.2d at 86 (quoting Merlino v. Mutual Service
Casualty Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 571, 127 N.W.2d 741 (1964)).
85. Stewart, 85 Wis. 2d at 476, 271 N.W.2d at 86; Blashaski v. Classified Risk Insurance
Corp., 48 Wis. 2d 169, 179 N.W.2d 924, 927 (1970); Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223,
234 N.W. 376 (1931).
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are an absolute bar to recovery. Such a harsh result is unnecessary when
the rules of comparative negligence are employed.
If proportional liability is imposed when the defendant's act is a
substantial factor, the purposes of proximate cause are satisfied by
limiting liability to acts that are closely connected to the injury. Accordingly, a negligent plaintiff will not be completely barred from recovery
when his intervening acts are found to be less negligent than the defendant's. Where there is a question of whether a plaintiff's wrongful act contributed to his injuries, whether the act be through contributory
6
negligence, assumption of risk, last clear chance, an obvious danger" or
causation.
an intervening act, the court should apply Wisconsin's test for
This test simplifies the determination of responsibility and allows the rules
of comparative negligence to work fairly for both the plaintiff and the
defendant.
JAY

T.

HoPKINS

86. See Note, supra note 70.
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